Abstract

Investment in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) can provide the means to correlate supply and demand with plant capabilities at various locations. Additionally, it can improve inventory planning, optimize the scheduling of field services and enable a quick response to upcoming market opportunities.

Introduction

Information technology (IT) has changed the way organizations function, with large numbers of smart gadgets continuously connected to the internet. These gadgets constitute what is known as the Internet of Things (IoT), and when extended to manufacturing and production, this is known as Industrial Internet of Things, or IIoT. The things in the IIoT are intelligent machines that share data using advanced communication technologies for more reliable, efficient and safe operation of plants. Most of the devices are connected to the network to allow continuous monitoring and control. IIoT has the potential to unleash benefits by providing information that can be used for increasing plant availability, resulting in operating the plant near the threshold design parameters and minimizing downtime. While technology is no longer a constraint, the means of implementing it for use in the industry can be challenging.

The IIoT is a trending topic in the process and automation industry. This technology has the potential to help the industry tap into capacity and capabilities that exist in plants but historically have gone unutilized. This paper focuses on the fundamentals, implementation and challenges of IIoT. IIoT usually refers to interconnected sensors, instruments and other devices in an industrial setting. This connectivity enables remote access and monitoring, and it facilitates data acquisition, collection, exchange and analysis from different sources. This has enormous potential for improving productivity and efficiency. IIoT solutions are characterized by their low cost and fast implementation.

For example, a supplier needs to publish new functionalities on the human-machine interface (HMI) for a client. However, when a machine is delivered and the client uses it for daily operations, it might require extra functionality to simplify the job further. An expansion of the control panel with a new function, such as an on/off switch or a percentage counter for the pump, can easily be fixed by the programmer. But the HMI software needs to be updated and tested to launch this new functionality. HMI software updates can easily be applied remotely via secure network access. Using a virtual network connection (VNC), HMI functionality in the IIoT platform or on a mobile device can be viewed and tested.

IIoT can also be useful in predicting maintenance and analyzing which part will need to be replaced. Sometimes it is easy to predict when a machine requires maintenance, for example, when the degradation rate for a machine is identified based on production hours or runtime. In these scenarios, it makes sense to implement predictive maintenance by using the variables (counters) of the programmable logic controller (PLC) software and logging this data to the cloud. Vendors can access the data, analyze the machine behavior and alert the client. Clients can also visualize the machine’s performance on the dashboard and get an email reminder when maintenance is due.

On-site machine maintenance visits are more effective when the technician is aware of the faults before reaching the site. The right spare parts can be identified in advance by analyzing potential problems using remote access and the online diagnostics tool of the device’s web server.

IoT Versus IIoT

IoT applications are deployed on devices in a range of industries, including agriculture, healthcare and consumer goods, as well as for municipalities. IoT devices include smart appliances, fitness bands and other applications that alert users in emergency situations when something goes amiss.

IIoT applications, on the other hand, connect machines and devices in industries such as oil and gas, utilities and manufacturing. System failures and downtime in IIoT deployments can result in high-risk or even life-threatening situations. IIoT applications are also more focused on improving efficiency and health and safety, versus the user-centric nature of IoT applications.

OT, IT and IIoT in Process-Driven Industries

The connection of all process parameters in a plant’s control system forms the backbone of operational technology (OT). Implementing OT capabilities on Ethernet, local area network (LAN) or wide area network (WAN) to share plant information for further optimization formalizes the concept of IT for the industry.

IIoT is a combination of OT and IT, bringing the process parameter information to a common platform to share relevant data with systems in real time. In process-driven industries, these inputs vary from the data of known tagged plant devices to information from untagged sensors that is available but remains unutilized. The innovations in hardware and their connectivity with communication networks in recent decades have made this a reality. The signal transmission from sensors has migrated from conventional 4-20 milliampere (mA) current signals to digital signals such as highway addressable remote transducer (HART), foundation fieldbus and wireless. These signals not only share details of process parameters but also provide diagnostic information about the sensor. Bringing this valuable information onto the network provides better insight into these individual components and improves the overall health of the plant.

With smart devices in place, critical processes can share ample information with the control systems on an open platform. A structured approach to scrutinize and analyze this data is required to gain real insight. IIoT predominantly shares plant data with original equipment manufacturers and analysis vendors on a secured network to get their opinions. The data is analyzed either locally or remotely to extract meaningful and actionable information for field operations.

Basic Architecture of IIoT

OT network: This network comprises field sensors integrated with the control system data highway. Supervisory control is implemented via operator stations on the data highway.
IT network: This consists of the enterprise network automatically collecting information from various plants and facilities and making it available on an open platform for further analysis.

Cloud: Industrial data is stored on the cloud and securely shared with third parties. This provides a standardized platform, allowing third parties to develop tools and applications independently. Smartphone apps connecting to the cloud can enable operators to read alerts, analyze data and take corrective action instantaneously.

Service provider network: This allows third parties to interpret and analyze data, deriving actionable information for the end user.

Evolution of Control Systems

IIoT is primarily an extension of the existing digital plant network (OT and IT). Data is sent to third-party specialists for analysis, providing valuable information for predictive control instead of reactive control. In other words, IIoT is an evolution of a distributed control system that allows for a higher degree of automation by using cloud computing to refine and optimize the process controls.

IIoT is transformational — changing the way industrial companies operate day to day. Examples could include enabling predictive analytics to detect corrosion inside a refinery pipe, providing real-time production data to uncover additional capacity in a plant, or accelerating new product development by feeding operations and service data back into the product design cycle. IIoT and the software solutions powered by it drive powerful business outcomes.

By combining machine-to-machine communication with industrial big data analytics, IIoT is driving unprecedented levels of efficiency, productivity and performance. And as a result, industrial companies are experiencing transformative operational and financial benefits.

The Need for IIoT

When major plant equipment breaks down, significant productivity is lost. The conventional way to address this is to have scheduled maintenance. However, what if the equipment malfunctions before this? It will lead to productivity loss. On the other hand, what if the equipment does not require maintenance? Then the time and efforts involved could be used for more productive work. This would assist in reducing downtime and saving money.

Process-driven industries already have a form of predictive maintenance, driven by integrated smart devices connected to the control system. However, the data required to adjust the predictive maintenance with machine behavior and assess the necessity of maintenance can be acquired with IIoT.

When the enterprise network observes repetitive faults in a similar process across various plants, IIoT shares that information with the service provider. The service provider can then work with the end user to perform a root cause analysis for critical faults, upgrade its own system and share lessons learned with the end user, thus enabling continual improvement. The shorter response time for similar issues and lower maintenance cycles improves plant operability.

Imagine if control of an offshore oil and gas platform gets completely digitized. Multiple providers have developed solutions to digitize operation of an oil and gas platform by making a digital twin. It consists of two main components: a process twin and a plant twin.
The process twin is a digital replica of the process and automation system that enables testing of the process and control, safety logic and operating procedures. The plant twin is a smart 3D model that provides access to equipment, carrying out real-time operations and maintenance by operating robotic arms on the platform from remote control rooms.

This digitization can reduce capital and operating expenses, shorten project development cycles, minimize interfacing risk and decrease offshore labor requirements. Accordingly, the digitization can bring down production costs significantly.

Relevant IoT Standards

Standard development organizations like the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have published their first editions of some standards to set the ground rules for data integration and its safety. These include:

ISO/IEC 20924: IoT — Vocabulary: This standard provides a definition of IoT along with a set of terms and definitions. This document is a terminology foundation for the IoT.
ISO/IEC 30141: IoT — Reference Architecture (IoT RA): This document specifies a general IoT reference architecture in terms of defining system characteristics, a conceptual model (CM), a reference model (RM) and architecture views. The reference architecture includes:

• The generic characteristics of IoT systems.
• The CM, describing the key concepts characterizing an IoT system.
• The RM, providing the overall structure of the elements of the architecture.
• A set of reference architecture views, describing the architecture from several perspectives.

In short, the IoT RA provides guidance to the architect developing an IoT system and aims to give a better understanding of IoT systems to the stakeholders of such systems, including device manufacturers, application developers, customers and users.

Challenges in Implementing IIoT

The manufacturing industry will have to overcome several challenges before IIoT systems are widely adopted. These include building up the standards around IIoT, high investment, connectivity, cybersecurity, data analysis and workforce adoption of a new set of skills.

Standardization

Industries need standards to allow smart devices, machines and other assets to interact with each other in predictable fashion. This goes beyond the normal communication protocols and involves generation of standard semantics and operating procedures, which will allow smart devices to discover and interact with each other.

High Investment

The upfront cost of updating from older products to IIoT-enabled products is very high. Among the main purposes of IIoT is to improve manufacturing efficiencies — and reduce the maintenance and financial losses attributed to equipment failures — through better asset management and productivity gains. Along with product development, support of resources specializing in IIoT is critical.

Connectivity

One of the main requirements for adopting IIoT is having reliable and strong data networks. Studies show that in 85% of factories worldwide, machines are not connected or are unable to collect or provide data and transmit it back. One of the main reasons is legacy devices have long life spans, do not support data-driven tools and offer few connectivity options. Also, because high-speed internet still is not consistently available everywhere, connectivity remains a significant challenge even where newer devices are implemented.

Cybersecurity

Bringing industrial data onto an open communication platform makes it more susceptible to cyberattacks.

The process plant networks, also known as supervisory networks, are primarily designed for integrated functionality and safe performance within the plant hierarchy. This design is based on the control system vendor’s proprietary software, which may require special skill sets. This supervisory network is generally set up using the enterprise network. When this is moved to the cloud, plant data is exposed to an external network, thus making critical information more vulnerable.

The IEC 62443 standard covers cybersecurity through the following sections:

• Section 1 – General: Defines concepts and models.
• Section 2 – Policies: Defines security management and patch management.
• Section 3 – System: Defines security technology and risk assessment.
• Section 4 – Component: Defines product development and technical security requirements.

The risk of cyberattacks can be mitigated by implementing the following:

• Network security parameters: Use of firewalls confirms isolation between the plant network and external network, as well as between third-party systems within the plant.
• Hardware locks: Integration of user ID and password into dedicated workstations limits access to authorized operators only.
• Account management: Planned, regular changes of user IDs and passwords for better security.
• Updates: Regular security updates in the form of patches keep systems armed against attacks by new viruses.
• Backup: An efficient backup and recovery plan allows operators to revert the system to a healthy state.
• Audits: Consistent security audits detect any unwanted events and assist in proactively mitigating issues.

Data Analysis

A main method for implementing IIoT solutions in manufacturing is to expand manufacturing facilities with tools for data acquisition, analysis and visualization. The sensory and control equipment connected to a SCADA system generates large amount of raw data, which needs to be analyzed to gain insights.

Analyzing this large amount of data is important to gain efficiencies. In many organizations, this valuable data is not collected or stored in a structured and efficient manner. So, it is important for organizations to hire data analysts with the required skills.

Workforce Adoption

The skill sets required to design and operate an IIoT-based system are very different from those needed to run a traditional automation system. A significant amount of retraining will be required for existing operators and maintenance staff to manage such systems.

Conclusion

The evolving concept of IIoT is creating a new turning point for many industries. Consider oil and gas, for example: The possibilities of analyzing captured data and utilizing the findings will benefit upstream (well site exploration and production), midstream (transportation pipelines) and downstream (onshore processing) sectors. Plants equipped with smart devices can obtain the maximum advantage from their existing digital infrastructure.

Investments in IIoT are expected to provide the means to correlate supply and demand with plant capabilities at various locations, improve inventory planning, optimize the scheduling of field services, and enable a quick response to upcoming market opportunities.

Technology suppliers, engineering contractors and end users all have roles to play in understanding the concept of IIoT. Even though implementation of IIoT will be driven by the end user, it is critical that any detailed engineering contractor has sufficient knowledge to execute the engineering design in accordance with the facility requirements.

Some of the key tasks in implementing IIoT will include finalizing the concept, designing architecture, employing open integration protocols, defining methods to consolidate data, mining data, assigning measures to mitigate risks, and identifying the flow of work across the organization.

The IIoT can bring about a steep change in operational activities and business strategies. However, security and maintaining the privacy of industrial networks are prime concerns and will continue to remain so. Unless regulatory standards are put in place and the means to minimize security breaches are established, industries will be challenged to gain all the possible advantages from IIoT.

Abstract
With widespread digitalisation of industry and business, plant wide internet interconnectedness across geographies, external cloud and so on, cybersecurity has become crucially important, and all the more so, in a highly knowledge and know-how based chemical industry. Cyber attacks could come from anywhere: from competitor rivals to countries wanting to steal know how or damage to even from terrorists.

This article is therefore very timely and covers in detail the various challenges involved in cybersecurity management. The article is based on key insights shared by cybersecurity experts from a range of industrial companies.

Introduction

Today, most industrial companies have two separate cybersecurity programs. Cybersecurity professionals in the CIO’s organization ensure the security of corporate data, IT assets, networks, and business applications. Technical personnel in operations and engineering take care of the security of OT networks and assets.

Differences in IT and OT technologies, goals, and environments justified the development of separate security programs. However, today’s siloed programs are leaving many plants especially in the chemical and oil and gas industries at risk of a serious cyber incident. OT cybersecurity programs often lack the resources, expertise, and supporting technology to maintain defenses, manage attacks, and secure the new technologies being deployed in operating facilities. CISO efforts to manage security are also being hampered by the lack of OT system visibility and access.

The situation is likely to get worse unless companies act. The industrial cyber threat environment is already becoming more challenging with ransomware, sophisticated attacks like Solar Winds, and the explosion of digital transformation programs. These developments demand proper maintained, end-to-end security of all corporate activities and rapid detection and response to all anomalous events. While most industrial IT security programs have the cyber professionals and advanced security solutions to deal with these new challenges, many OT security programs are still struggling to achieve yesterday’s requirements.

IT/OT cybersecurity convergence offers a cost-effective way to address current and future OT security challenges. IT cyber professionals can fill critical resource and expertise gaps in OT security programs. Common cybersecurity processes can eliminate security gaps between IT and OT systems. Use of similar technologies can enhance visibility and incident response effectiveness.

While convergence offers many benefits, experience shows that combining IT and OT programs can be challenging. Successful convergence efforts have clear convergence goals and proven approaches for addressing critical issues like cultural differences and OT reluctance to use conventional IT security practices and technologies. This article presents some of the lessons learned by leading companies that are already on cybersecurity convergence journeys, with a special slant on the chemical and oil and gas sectors.

The Different Goals of IT and OT Teams

Industrial cybersecurity teams face an awesome set of responsibilities and challenges. IT security teams, which are often part of the CIO’s organization, are responsible for managing the security of a wide range of information processing technologies, including workstations, servers, networks, printers, websites, cloud applications, and mobile devices. This includes ensuring the confidentiality of all corporate information and the continuous availability of critical business systems and applications.

OT security teams are commonly assigned to specific facilities and commonly report to plant managers or corporate engineering managers. These people are responsible for ensuring the availability and integrity of control systems, SCADA systems, and a diverse collection of cyber physical systems like robots, packaging systems, etc. Managers expect them to prevent any cyber incidents that might impact safety, product quality, environmental compliance, or operational continuity.

While IT and OT security teams may collaborate on security of interfaces, decisions about OT security within facilities are generally made and funded locally, based on each site’s risk appetite, capabilities, and preferences. IT cybersecurity programs are generally more advanced than those in OT.

The picture is quite different for industrial OT cybersecurity programs. While many sites recognize the need for OT cybersecurity, they rarely invest in more than the basic passive defensive technologies recommended by industry groups. Many also neglect the need to invest in people and solutions to maintain these defenses.

Converging Security Processes

Ransomware and sophisticated attacks have clearly raised top management concern about cyber-attacks. They expect that IT/OT cybersecurity convergence efforts will provide them the visibility and confidence they need to be sure that all cyber risks are being properly managed across all systems and assets. Consistent security metrics, policies, and processes are essential for this goal.

A common cybersecurity framework provides the foundation for driving consistency across IT and OT cybersecurity efforts. It enables people with significantly different backgrounds to agree on key security issues and the actions needed to address them. An effective framework is comprehensive yet abstract enough to avoid specific implementation details and conflicts about specific security practices and technologies.

Many companies have adopted the NIST Cybersecurity Framework as the overall framework for IT/OT cybersecurity convergence. The completeness of this framework and its general acceptance ensure that all issues are addressed. This framework also provides guidance to specific IT and OT practices, in standards like IEC-62443, NIST 800-XX, and ISO 27000, that can help companies meet the requirements. Some companies have also used the CIS 20 to guide discussions. OT security teams will likely have concerns about the use of IT technologies and practices in OT. But these can be alleviated by ensuring that they are involved in these decisions and can ensure that critical OT constraints are properly considered and respected.

Regardless of the formal reporting structure, converged IT/OT cybersecurity programs generally have a single person who is responsible for cybersecurity. Most often this is the CISO, or the CIO when the CISO is part of the IT organization. This person establishes security policies, monitors compliance, and prepares periodic cybersecurity reports for top management. They may also be charged with setting specific security objectives, managing third-party security agreements, and developing recommendations for new cybersecurity people, processes, and technologies.

Setting an Appropriate Convergence Goal

Many industrial organizations have launched IT/OT cybersecurity convergence programs, but the goals vary significantly. Some want to maintain separate IT and OT cybersecurity programs but improve collaboration in securing system interfaces. Others want to integrate efforts in key areas, like DMZs, where OT uses conventional IT technologies and can support common IT security products and practices. Still others are targeting a complete reorganization of people, processes, and technologies to create a unified corporate cybersecurity program.

These differences reflect the tremendous variations that exist in industrial facilities and digital transformation goals. Some companies have critical operations where a cyber incident could have devastating impacts. Others have simple operations that can tolerate minor OT system disruptions. Some facilities can reap tremendous value from new technologies and OT connectivity, while others see little or no benefits. And many industrial cybersecurity teams need to deal with facilities in all of these categories.

Recognizing the benefits of different convergence goals is essential for establishing rational site-specific programs. Building a converged IT/OT cybersecurity program will ultimately involve some changes to security people, processes, and technologies. The willingness of operational managers to support these changes depends upon the costs and benefits that will be generated.

Regardless of a program’s goals, there are certain guidelines that should be considered in every IT/OT cybersecurity convergence program:

• IT and OT cybersecurity are equally important. Industrial companies need to protect information, people, and operating assets throughout the corporation to ensure business continuity.
• Convergence is more than just transferring OT security to IT security teams. Conventional IT technologies and practices may work in certain OT system areas, but others will always require people with unique expertise, familiarity, and local access.
• Convergence pace will vary across sites, so convergence plans must anticipate support for sites at different stages of their convergence

Convergence is Primarily a People Problem

ARC research consistently shows that people represent the biggest challenge for IT/OT cybersecurity convergence programs. Much of this is due to the cultural differences between people who work in office and plant environments. IT and OT security people also have different skills, perspectives on the challenges and approaches to security management.

Building trust between IT and OT personnel is essential but challenging. Successful efforts foster trust through collaborative involvement of both groups in the development of security metrics, standards, policies, and processes. This facilitates effective teamwork through common terminology, shared understanding of risks, and recognition of individual strengths. It also helps to focus everyone’s attention on the issues that represent the highest risks to the organization.

Gaining support from operations and engineering managers is equally important. This requires successful interactions that demonstrate IT respect for plant performance goals. Many companies find that plant engineers are happy to offload responsibility for cybersecurity tasks like patching, once they are confident that cybersecurity professionals won’t create problems for normal system operation.

Retaining cybersecurity resources is another issue that needs to be addressed when planning convergence programs. The general shortage of cybersecurity experts makes it hard to replace these critical people. Managers need to ensure that employees find assignments rewarding and create opportunities for advancement along well-defined career paths. Framing cybersecurity as a separate profession with cross-training opportunities can help in this regard.

Attention must also be given to the role that third parties can play in satisfying resource requirements. This can enable companies to offload some tasks and ensure that permanent employees have the necessary time to focus on critical issues like vulnerability and threat management. Many industrial companies rely upon third parties for security assessments, penetration tests, audits, workshops, and table-top exercises.

End User Perspectives on IT/OT Cybersecurity Convergence

At the ARC Industry 2021 Forum, users from the chemical and oil and gas sectors discussed the people and process challenges of IT/OT cybersecurity convergence. They highlighted the need to move away from the “them vs. us” approach. What works best is combining efforts, talking to each other, and replicating best practices. As systems evolve, it is important to have a cross-fertilization of ideas, experiences, and skillsets to arrive at a single solution – this is the winning way. The entire session can be watched here.

In a second IT/OT cybersecurity convergence session, another set of users discussed the technology challenges. Consensus was that convergence of technologies across IT and OT boundaries gives better outcomes. Securing OT systems and getting the basics right is not easy, they opined. So, instead of reinventing the wheel, proven solutions/techniques can be taken from the IT world and tweaked to suit OT needs. The session can be viewed here.

Recommendations

Many industrial companies are working to converge cybersecurity efforts across business areas and technology domains. Reasons vary but they all see convergence as a way to address a variety of OT cybersecurity challenges including lack of resources, more sophisticated attacks, and digital transformation. ARC research suggests that these benefits can be achieved if companies set appropriate convergence goals and take steps to avoid the major obstacles that can derail their efforts.

ARC has been researching IT/OT cybersecurity convergence for many years and this topic has been the focus of numerous cybersecurity workshops at ARC Forums. The information in this report summarized some of the key insights shared by cybersecurity leaders from a range of industrial companies who have been involved in these discussions. While every company has unique challenges, they will still face similar challenges as they strive to change cybersecurity status quo. Our hope is that this report will help you overcome those challenges.

Based on this and related research, ARC recommends the following actions for owner-operators and other technology users:

• Set realistic goals for your cybersecurity convergence efforts and plan to achieve that goal incrementally using the goals we described as collaboration, integration, and unification. The benefits achieved at each step will garner the support you will need to continue the journey.
• Adopt an overall cybersecurity framework to build your team, identify next steps, and focus your efforts to converge people, processes, and technologies.
• Address people, processes, and technology challenges in that order.
• Consider establishing cybersecurity as a specific discipline within your company. This can ease human resource issues if you choose to develop a single cybersecurity organization.
• Be realistic in your expectations – change takes time. Recognize that every improvement is a step to your ultimate goal of safe and secure operations.
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All this and more will be discussed at the 26th Annual ARC Industry Forum from February 14-17, 2022 (physical event, Orlando) and March 7-10, 2022 (online).

Introduction

During the lockdowns last year in their various incarnations, whether first covid wave or second wave and its lifting thereafter, partial or otherwise, too many accidents have taken place in the chemical and allied industries, bringing into question the very existence of chemical plants and their operation. That number is around 100. What went wrong? The word ‘Chemical’ is taboo for the public. Chemicals can be very simple molecules requiring only a few steps for synthesis and plant operations or they could be complex structures needing many steps leading to waste of materials and energy at each stage. Hazard is present at each stage. Even a slight variation in the geometrical, conformational or stereo properties can make a chemical toxic or non-toxic. Can dyes, surfactants and other intermediates be made safe through design or redesign looking at the sectors where they are used? Remember, the chemical industry is very diverse, producing thousands of substances which are used by other industries and that are present in countless consumer products. No man-made product can be made without the use of chemicals. The chemical industry makes products with many beneficial uses, but they can also have negative impacts on human health and the environment. By their nature, the manufacture, storage, and transport of chemicals have the potential for accidents to happen. Chemicals can be toxic, and they may react, often violently and explosively during transport, storage, or reaction. The impacts of chemical accidents can be deadly. Public faith has eroded due to the negative coverage in media, notwithstanding the fact that chemical and allied industries including refineries, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, polymers, agrochemicals, intermediates, etc. are essential and an important segment of the economy. They are not optional; they will contribute very significantly to hon’ble P.M.’s dream of USD 5 trillion economy, the China factor notwithstanding.

Defining Accidents

So, what is an accident or incident? To describe health and safety in workplaces, incidents and accidents are extremely common and often these two terms are interchanged. In most cases they indicate the level of destruction or damage that results from a workplace occurrence. Accident is an unexpected event which results in serious injury or illness of an employee and may also result in property damage. A “near-miss”covers a narrowly averted accident whereas Incident means an instance of something happening, an unexpected event or occurrence that doesn’t result in serious injury or illness but may result in property damage. All of them are associated with unexpectedness. All industries face all these realities.

Accidents are part and parcel of modern civilization, if we step out of our homes, in our workplaces, no matter what job we do or how we travel, something unexpected can happen. The frequency and severity of such accidents are the real causes to worry about. So, what lessons has the industry learnt to avoid accidents? Can the plants be operated safely? Can the Chemical Industry be as safe as the Nuclear Industry or beyond? As an educator and researcher, I would like the readers to ponder on what follows.

Risk in Polymerization

Accidents can happen due to many factors and the most talked about term in the industry is ‘Runaway’ situation: uncontrolled temperature rise leading to untoward consequence as has been the case with many major accidents over the years. (Table 1). The Vizag accident on May 7, 2020, due to styrene leak in the vapour form (not the gas as the ‘breaking news- TV channels’ said) brought to my attention, how polymerizations could lead to runaway: initiation, propagation and termination. What triggers an incident, what propagates it and how to terminate it. The objective of Loss Prevention is: Minimize the probability that the accident begins or maximize the probability that the sequence terminates benignly if it does start, or minimize the consequence if it terminates malignantly.

You might have studied it in polymerizations: initiation, propagation, and termination as part of reaction mechanism. You will be surprised to know that polymerizations lead the cases of accidents in industry, followed by nitration, sulfonation, hydrolysis, salt formation, hydrolysis, halogenation, Friedel Crafts alkylation, amination, diazotization, oxidation, esterification and hydrogenation, which normally would be thought to be more dangerous! This has been given by the great author Trevor Kletz, with whom I had the honour of sharing the office for a year in the Loughborough University (of Technology, then) during 1980-81 when I was a young Leverhulme Fellow. He worked for the ICI, UK, now defunct. He is used to write his books and would discuss it with Professor Frank Lees and Dr Pete Andow from the same University, who are equally well known on process safety and risk management. Frank Lees’ books on Loss Prevention are legendary. So what is process Safety.

What is System Safety Process?
A systematic approach to process improvement requires proactively searching for opportunities to improve the process at every step, not simply identifying deficiencies after an undesired event. The steps in the system safety process are depicted graphically in Fig 1.

So, if you are in the business of manufacturing: “Expect the unexpected” and anticipate that accidents can happen even in the most ‘benign’ plant due to human error. Most accidents are due to human error. Some of the pertinent questions to be asked are:

• The specific type of incident/accident was not anticipated by the design engineers or system while designing or operating the plant, and for which, of course, there was no emergency plan for prevention and containment with no loss or minimum loss of life, plant and/or business. Loss of prestige of the manufacturer is disastrous for business.

• Was the Incident/Accident either due to failure of equipment or human error?

• Human error or overfamiliarity is the majority cause of accidents (>95%)

• What was the inherent process hazard analyzed and steps were taken into account?

• Was accident due to less attention to safety to save money or due to short-cut in the SOP?

• Were natural causes due to flood, earthquake, tsunami, etc. considered, due to the geography?

• What about the molecular group or hazardous properties of all chemicals and materials on the site, and not just in process? Were all these likely causes of accident considered while designing or operating the plant?

• What about the hazard and risk due to the neighbouring plant and processes in the same zone?

• Was process simulation for hazard identification, analysis and risk management done during start-up or commissioning or actual operation?

• Who trains the new personnel on past accidents in the same plant? Is it hidden from new recruitment causing more danger to both parties?

Risk can emanate from anywhere

Many accidents are started by the plants in the vicinity or processes of which no knowledge is shared due to trade secrecy. The adage should be ‘Keep an eye on your neighour.’ Recent events in Indian industry are a testimony to this fact. In Chemical Process Industry everything, including the Material, Machine or Man, has a potential to cause incident or accident, unfortunately in that order. If it is a chemical in process or storage or transported as gas, liquid, or solid form, it has a potential to cause disastrous consequence. The chemical on site which is not part of the process can cause severe damage if its properties are not considered. The management must know all their chemicals, solvents and personnel who are running the plants and deal with them daily. As the proverb goes familiarity can breed contempt. Training of personnel from time to time, including the security at the site who have to deal with the emergency, is very crucial.

Risk is typically defined as ‘hazard x exposure’ or ‘consequence x probability’. Making the probability zero or exposure zero would be the most ideal solution. The normal definition of hazard is inadequate when we consider accidents which have taken place over the years. Hazard is not restricted to physical hazards such as explosiveness, flammability, and corrodibility, but certainly also includes acute and chronic toxicity, carcinogenicity, and ecological toxicity. Hazard must include global threats such as global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, resource depletion and bioaccumulation, and persistent chemicals. Intrinsically hazardous properties of chemicals constitute those issues that can be addressed through the proper design or redesign of chemistry and chemicals. So much so we can define ‘Safer Chemicals’ to reduce pollution and risk at source. The advances in molecular toxicology and the relationship between chemical structure and important property exploited for industrial application are the basic tools. Synthesis using Catalysis, Renewable Resources, Atom Economy and Solventless Conditions will be the hallmark of plants in the future.

Inherently Safe

In fact, industry must move from Current Chemicals to Inherently Safer Chemicals to Inherently Safer Plants by adopting the following strategies:

• Designing a new molecule that is safe
• Redesigning an existing molecule to make it safe
• Increasing user safety.
• Increasing transportation safety by training the drivers and attendants on duty. Not to extend the duty more than 3 hours at stretch and change the driver or take rest for some time. The same driver should not have more than 7 hours duty in a day.
• But how do we manufacture a given chemical, inherently safe or otherwise?
• What is the limit of our “smartness” in tailor-making a molecule or product?
• What about the currently manufactured Chemicals & the plants?

If the industries develop, design, operate and control a chemical process such that the consequence is reduced because of different chemistry, chemicals, conditions or simplicity, wouldn’t the safety of the plant be improved? Is this not better than layers of protection?
This leads to the concept of ‘Inherently Chemical Safer Plants’. The Inherent Safety Structure which is part of the conceptual process synthesis structure consists of three parts: Hazard Identification, Hazard Evaluation, and Inherent Safety Evolution. Chemical business has an inherent hazard which should be mitigated by designing and operating plants safely.

Safer Design

• If we could design a process with fewer hazards, then the process would be simplified, and the safeguards reduced.
• This is the essence of inherently safer design—to eliminate hazards rather than to provide complex safeguard hierarchies around the hazards.
• An inherently safer plant (Fig 2) uses the elimination of hazards to prevent accidents rather than depending on control systems, interlocks, redundancy, special management systems, complex operating instructions, or elaborate procedures. Inherently safer plants are tolerant of errors; are generally cost-effective; and are simpler, easier to operate, and more reliable.

If the industries develop, design, operate and control a chemical process such that the consequence is reduced because of different chemistry, chemicals, conditions or simplicity, wouldn’t the safety of the plant be improved? Is this not better than layers of protection?

Four Categories of Chemical Safety Process Strategies
1. Inherent
2. Passive
3. Active
4. Procedural

I will discuss them one by one:

1. Inherent

This approach to chemical plant safety involves the elimination or significant decrease of hazards within the plant, by applying changes in process conditions, chemistries, and technologies used throughout the process, making sure that these cannot be easily changed or bypassed without changing the process or the plant design itself. Inherent safety can be brought into the plant, for instance, by the substitution of a flammable solvent by water is an excellent case of an inherent safety strategy: by switching one for the other, the potential of fire is eliminated, exposure to toxic vapors, and possible contamination of wastewater in one simple step are avoided.

2. Passive
A strategy that typically revolves around process and equipment design features, passive chemical safety strategies reduce the frequency or consequence of hazardous events taking place. For example, building blast walls around process equipment can prevent explosions from causing uncontrollable damage to surrounding areas and workers; also, using equipment with higher pressure rating than their processes typically demand can ensure that dangerous spikes in pressure are controlled naturally.

3. Active
These strategies require an active response, typically from engineering controls or human operators. Unlike inherent or passive safety strategies, these mostly occur once the event is taking place, and are a safeguard for the plant, its workers, and its surroundings before disasters can occur. Some examples include sprinklers and similar fire suppression systems, pressure relief devices, purging systems, flares, and feed interlocks, which close valves and shut off pumps to prevent overflows.

4. Procedural
The final strategy is not actually an engineering control, but instead an administrative control: operating procedures, safety rules and responses, safe work practices, and training are all included in procedural chemical safety strategies. An excellent example involves the training and responses expected of operators within a plant’s control room, who must always be prepared to take action when abnormally high temperatures or significant change in operational pressure take place.

The four engineering concepts in a nutshell are abbreviated as M, S, M, S which are explained in figure 3.

Safety Culture and Way Forward:

• In an industrial zone or cluster of industries, it should be mandatory for all factories to let the neighbours know what chemicals and materials they use and process, without disclosing the trade secrets. Remember there is no secret about an accident. For instance, the maximum operating conditions and preparedness for accident prevention and propagation must be known to authorities. This will help the nearby sites to be ready with emergency plans should there be an accident or fire or catastrophe.
• All degree programmes in Chemical & Biological Sciences, Engineering & Technology must teach compulsorily Chemical Process Safety and Risk Management Courses and have in-plant training of 6 months. Those who work in chemical and allied industries must undergo a course on Process Safety and Risk Management. Refresher courses must be conducted. Industry must facilitate such training for their own benefit. On the Board of Directors, a Director for Innovation and Process Safety must be appointed under whose guidance a team works at each manufacturing site.
• There is a need of more Centres of Excellence for Research & Innovation on Process Safety and Risk Management in some leading Institutes.
• A National Chemical Safety Board ought to be established by GoI, directly reporting to the PMO like the OPCW to investigate all accidents and create a database and give guidelines to the industry. It is NOT disaster management board. This Board must be independent from the Pollution Control Boards and must have experts who can help in critically analyzing all accidents in the past across the globe and giving guidance at the time of accident propagation. The requirements of the Chemical Industry are totally different and Industries Associations must pursue this matter in their own interest because the Atma Nirbhar Bharat (Self Reliant India) will give them an opportunity to make new chemicals and materials including polymers. The China factor must be exploited to be part of the UDS 5 trillion.
• And last but not the least, public awareness programmes must be conducted from time to time by industries or their associations, for the benefit of colonies and communities nearby which can be directly affected, should there by an accident.